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Despite growing knowledge and education 
about various groups of people, stereotyping, 
prejudice, and discrimination remain in 
present society (Fiske, 1998). It is 
unacceptable for people to openly show 
dislike or favoritism toward various groups of 
people due to an emphasis on being politically 
correct in America today (Voils, Ashburn-
Nardo, & Monteith, 2002). Most people today 
have direct contact with other diverse groups 
of people. People who have exposure to other 
diverse groups of people tend to view these 
other diverse groups of people at the very 
least as human beings with equal basic legal 
rights (Shelton & Richeson, 2005). People 
have established laws to ban discrimination 
against certain groups of people such as 
African Americans, women, and people with 
disabilities 
(http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html). 
However, even with increased exposure and 
education to other diverse groups of people, 
some of these groups of people (i.e., 
homosexuals, people with mental disabilities, 
and the elderly) still experience stereotyping, 
prejudice, and discrimination (Shelton & 
Richeson, 2005).  
 
 
 
 
Stereotypes 
A stereotype is a collection of 
attributes that are applied by an individual to 
another person or group of people (Fiske, 
1998; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Snyder & 
Miene, 1994). Because individuals are 
regularly exposed to a large amount of 
information, it is necessary to use cognitive 
shortcuts to reduce the cognitive effort needed 
to process incoming information (Macrae, 
Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Snyder & 
Miene, 1994). If an individual holds a 
stereotype about a certain group of people, 
that individual may use his or her stereotype 
to try and predict attributes and behaviors of a 
person in that certain group of people (Fiske, 
1998; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Macrae et 
al., 1994). For example, if a perceiver sees a 
man with bright clothing, a slight build, and 
meticulously coiffed hair, this perceiver may 
believe that this man is gay because this man 
fits into this perceiver’s stereotype of a gay 
male. This perceiver may also use his or her 
gay male stereotype to predict that this man 
must also be effeminate in his mannerisms 
and knows how to decorate houses.  
Individuals use stereotypes to pay 
attention to stereotype-confirming 
information and to not pay attention to 
stereotype-disconfirming information (Fiske, 
1998; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; von 
Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1995). 
Individuals form stereotypes based on what 
information is important to these individuals 
about other individuals (Fiske, 1998). When 
individuals notice information that is 
important to them, a stereotype may be 
triggered (Biernat & Ma, 2005; Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000). For example, a 
perceiver may believe it is very important to 
know the sexual orientations of people with 
whom he or she interacts. If this perceiver has 
a stereotype of lesbians as being masculine 
and meets a woman with very short hair and 
trousers, this stereotype-confirming 
information could be used by this perceiver to 
reinforce this perceiver’s stereotype of 
lesbians as being masculine. However, this 
perceiver may not have noticed that this 
woman had painted fingernails and a feminine 
   
 
blouse. This perceiver would not use this 
stereotype inconsistent information to prevent 
this perceiver from categorizing this woman 
as a lesbian and disconfirm this perceiver’s 
stereotype of lesbians as masculine.  
Individuals use information they 
notice about other individuals to categorize 
these other individuals (Fiske, 1998; Hilton & 
von Hippel, 1996). Because an individual 
may notice an attribute of another person that 
corresponds with a stereotype of a certain 
group of people, that individual may then 
categorize that other person as belonging to 
that certain group of people (Hilton & von 
Hippel, 1996). For example, a perceiver may 
interpret short hair and trousers on women as 
attributes of lesbians. Based on information 
this perceiver noticed about a woman, this 
perceiver may categorize this woman with 
short hair and trousers as a lesbian.  
Individuals may interpret information 
about other individuals in different ways as 
this information relates to those individuals’ 
stereotypes (Jackson, Sullivan, & Hodge, 
1993; Pettigrew, 1979). Information can be 
interpreted positively, negatively, or neutrally 
(Jackson et al., 1993; Pettigrew, 1979). For 
example, one perceiver may view a man who 
dresses flamboyantly and has well coiffed 
hair as being an indicator that this man’s 
sexual orientation is gay. Another perceiver 
may view this man who dresses flamboyantly 
and has well coiffed hair as being an indicator 
that this man’s profession is creative.  
Individuals are also more likely to 
remember stereotype-confirming information 
than to remember stereotype-disconfirming 
information (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). 
Because individuals notice stereotype-
confirming information more often than they 
notice stereotyping-disconfirming 
information, these individuals get repeated 
exposure to and pay more attention to 
stereotype-confirming information than to 
stereotyping-disconfirming information 
(Cameron & Trope, 2004; Hilton & von 
Hippel, 1996; Trope & Thompson, 1997). 
When individuals repeatedly attend to certain 
information, these individuals are likely to 
remember this certain information (Hilton & 
von Hippel, 1996). For example, if a 
perceiver notices that a gay man wears 
flamboyant clothing on a daily basis, this 
perceiver’s repeated exposure to this 
information may lead to a strengthening of 
this perceiver’s stereotype of gay men 
dressing flamboyantly. 
Individuals use stereotypes to recall 
attributes of another person or group of 
people (Fiske, 1998; Hilton & von Hippel, 
1996). Because stereotype-confirming 
information is more effectively stored in 
memory than is stereotype-disconfirming 
information, individuals can more easily 
retrieve and recall from memory stereotype-
confirming information than from stereotype-
disconfirming information (Hilton & von 
Hippel, 1996). For example, when a perceiver 
with a stereotype of lesbians as being 
masculine recalls meeting a woman with short 
hair and trousers, this perceiver is more likely 
to remember this woman’s short hair and 
trousers and less likely remember this 
woman’s painted nails or feminine blouse.  
Individuals use stereotypes to infer 
attributes about another person or group of 
people (Fiske, 1998). Individuals use 
stereotypes as cognitive shortcuts to reduce 
these individuals’ cognitive effort to help 
these individuals predict attributes and 
behaviors of others (Biernat & Ma, 2005; 
Fiske, 1998). When individuals can predict 
several attributes and behaviors of others 
based on a few known attributes, these 
individuals save themselves the cognitive 
effort of finding out more about those others 
(Fiske, 1998; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). 
Individuals’ stereotypes of groups of people 
are composed of lists of attributes that these 
individuals expect these groups to have 
(Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000). Individuals may use 
these lists of attributes to infer missing 
information about other individuals that these 
individuals have categorized as members of 
those stereotyped groups (Hilton & von 
Hippel, 1996; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). 
For example, a perceiver’s stereotype about 
gay men as effeminate may include that gay 
men are flamboyantly dressed, sexually 
   
 
promiscuous, artistic, and weak. When this 
perceiver sees a man who is flamboyantly 
dressed and this perceiver has categorized that 
man as a gay man, this perceiver may also 
infer that because that man is a gay man, that 
man must also be sexually promiscuous, 
artistic, and weak to match this perceiver’s 
stereotype of a gay man.  
Individuals use stereotypes to make 
judgments about other individuals and groups 
(Fiske, 1998). Stereotypes are composed of 
attributes about people in those stereotyped 
groups (Gill, 2004). Some individuals may 
value certain attributes and devalue other 
attributes. Individuals may judge people 
within those groups based on those attributes 
these individuals believe these groups possess 
(Gill, 2004). For example, if a perceiver has a 
stereotype of lesbians as being masculine, this 
perceiver may view women who have 
masculine attributes as being lesbian and also 
as being deviant from feminine women. This 
perceiver views deviation of women from 
being feminine as negative and will view 
women with masculine attributes as lesbian 
and also as negative. If this perceiver meets a 
woman with masculine attributes, this 
perceiver will likely classify this woman as a 
lesbian and have a negative attitude toward 
this woman. This perceiver may then be more 
alert to other negative attributes than to 
positive attributes of this woman. 
Individuals use stereotypes and 
attitudes based on those stereotypes to react to 
other individuals and groups (Fiske, 1998). 
Discrimination occurs when individuals act in 
a way to the advantage or disadvantage of 
groups of people or of an individual perceived 
to belong to those groups of people based on 
these individuals’ stereotypes of those groups 
of people (Fiske, 1998). Individuals are more 
likely to act in an advantageous manner 
towards members of these individuals’ own 
group than toward members of other groups 
(Fiske, 1998; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). For 
example, a perceiver can have a stereotype of 
gay men as being promiscuous. If this 
perceiver were to be in charge of health care 
for this man, this perceiver may withhold 
helpful safe sex information for this man 
because this perceiver believes this man is 
promiscuous and will contract a sexually 
transmitted infection (STI) eventually.  
 
Sex and Sexual Orientation Stereotypes 
Individuals have stereotypes about 
men and women. There are both positive and 
negative attributes in individuals’ stereotypes 
of men (e.g., Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; 
Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman & 
Goodwin, 2004). Positive stereotype 
attributes about men are men are less likely 
than women to be gullible, men are more 
independent than are women, and men make 
decisions more easily than do women. 
Negative stereotype attributes about men are 
men are more aggressive than are women, 
men are more arrogant than are women, and 
men are more insensitive than are women. 
There are also both positive and negative 
attributes in individuals’ stereotypes of 
women. Positive stereotype attributes about 
women are women are more nurturing than 
are men, women are more helpful than are 
men, and women are more aware of others’ 
feelings than are men. Negative stereotype 
attributes about women are women are more 
submissive than are men, women are more 
nagging than are men, and women are more 
melodramatic than are men. 
Individuals have stereotypes about gay 
men and lesbians. There are both positive and 
negative attributes in individuals’ stereotypes 
of gay men (e.g., Jackson & Sullivan, 1989; 
Kite & Whitley, 1996; Madon, 1997; Taylor, 
1983). Positive stereotype attributes about gay 
men are gay men are more artistic than are 
heterosexual men, gay men are less physically 
threatening than are heterosexual men, and 
gay men are neater than are heterosexual men. 
Negative stereotype attributes about gay men 
are gay men are more likely than heterosexual 
men to molest children, gay men are more 
flamboyant in behavior and dress than are 
heterosexual men, and gay men are more 
sexually promiscuous than are heterosexual 
men. There are also both positive and 
negative attributes in individuals’ stereotypes 
of lesbians (Madon, 1997; Newman, 1989; 
Taylor, 1983; Viss & Burn, 1992). Positive 
   
 
stereotype attributes about lesbians are 
lesbians are more independent than 
heterosexual women, lesbians are more 
intelligent than heterosexual women, and 
lesbians are more open-minded than 
heterosexual women. Negative stereotype 
attributes about lesbians are that lesbians are 
more aggressive than are heterosexual 
women, lesbians are more unattractive than 
are heterosexual women, and lesbians are 
more sexually deviant than are heterosexual 
women. 
Men and women differ in how they 
use stereotypes about other men and women 
(Beauvais & Spence, 1987). When perceiving 
others, men and women are more likely to pay 
attention to sex of individuals than to other 
factors (e.g., Beauvais & Spence, 1987). Men 
and women use sex as a primary way to 
categorize information about other people 
(e.g., Beauvais & Spence, 1987). Both men 
and women perceive women more favorably 
than men (e.g., Eagly & Mladinic, 1989). 
Men and women may favor women to men 
due to many factors (e.g., Eagly & Mladinic, 
1989). Some of these factors are women are 
perceived as less threatening than men and 
that negative stereotyped attributes prescribed 
to women are less hostile than those attributes 
prescribed to men (e.g., Eagly & Mladinic, 
1989). If a woman succeeds at a masculine 
task (e.g., fixing a flat tire), her success could 
be perceived as due to situational causes (e.g., 
Swim & Sanna, 1996). If a man succeeds at a 
masculine task (e.g., building a desk), his 
success could be perceived as due to 
dispositional causes (e.g., Swim & Sanna, 
1996). 
Men and women differ in how they 
use stereotypes about gay men and lesbians 
(Herek, 2000, 2002a; Herek & Capitanio, 
1999). Men have more negative stereotypes 
about gay men than do women (e.g., Herek & 
Capitanio, 1999; Jellison, McConnell, & 
Gabriel, 2004; LaMar & Kite, 1998). Men 
also have more negative stereotypes about 
gay men than about lesbians (e.g., Herek & 
Capitanio, 1999; Jellison et al., 2004; LaMar 
& Kite, 1998). Men have more favorable 
attitudes toward lesbians than toward gay men 
perhaps because men eroticize lesbian 
sexuality and do not eroticize gay male 
sexuality (e.g., Louderback & Whitley, 
1997).Women have similarly negative 
stereotypes about both gay men and lesbians 
(e.g., LaMar & Kite, 1998). 
The speculated reasons behind the 
differences in men and women’s perceptions 
of gay men and lesbians are many. Men’s 
attitudes toward gay men and lesbians could 
be influenced by sex roles (Madon, 1997). 
Men may view gay men and lesbians as 
violators of prescribed sex roles for men and 
women (e.g, Madon, 1997). Women’s 
attitudes toward gay men and lesbians could 
be influenced by many factors (e.g., Basow & 
Johnson, 2000). Women consider factors such 
as parental attitudes and education as well as 
violation of sex roles when forming attitudes 
about gay men and lesbians (e.g., Basow & 
Johnson, 2000).  
Individuals use sex roles to distinguish 
what traits are socially desirable for men and 
women to possess (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989). 
It is socially desirable for men to possess 
positive masculine attributes such as 
assertiveness and confidence (e.g., Prentice & 
Carranza, 2002). It is socially desirable for 
women to possess positive feminine attributes 
such as nurturance and compassion (e.g., 
Prentice & Carranza, 2002). It is more 
socially desirable for men to possess negative 
masculine attributes such as arrogance and 
greed than for men to possess negative 
feminine attributes such as weakness and 
gullibility (e.g., Prentice & Carranza, 2002). It 
is more socially desirable for women to 
possess negative feminine attributes such as 
anxiety and difficulty making a decision than 
for women to possess negative masculine 
attributes such as aggression and insensitivity 
(e.g., Prentice & Carranza, 2002). Men and 
women who violate these sex roles may face 
prejudice and discrimination against them 
(e.g., Jellison et al., 2004).  
Men, women, homosexuals, and 
heterosexuals are each an ingroup (Eagly & 
Stewart, 1995; Fiske, 1998; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 
Eagly, & Stewart, 1995; Ostrom & Sedikides, 
1992). An ingroup for men is other men, an 
   
 
ingroup for women is other women, an 
ingroup for homosexuals is other 
homosexuals, and an ingroup for 
heterosexuals is other heterosexuals. 
Individuals favor their ingroup more than 
their outgroups (Fiske, 1998; Ostrom & 
Sedikides, 1992). An outgroup is a group of 
individuals who do not belong to a perceiver’s 
ingroup (Fiske, 1998; Messick & Mackie, 
1989; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). For 
example, a heterosexual man belongs to his 
ingroup of heterosexuals and gay men and 
lesbians belong to his outgroup of 
homosexuals. Individuals often view 
members of their ingroup as being more 
diverse (i.e., heterogenous) than members of 
an outgroup (e.g., De Cremer, 2001; Fiske, 
1998; Lorenzi-Cioldi et al., 1995; Ostrom & 
Sedikides, 1992). Individuals often view 
members of an outgroup as more similar (i.e., 
homogenous) than members of their ingroup 
(e.g., De Cremer, 2001; Fiske, 1998; Lorenzi-
Cioldi et al., 1995; Ostrom & Sedikides, 
1992).  
Individuals view members of an 
outgroup as homogenous, and these 
individuals may rely upon their stereotypes of 
these outgroups when interacting with 
members of an outgroup (e.g., Hegarty & 
Pratto, 2004; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). 
Individuals view members of their ingroups 
as heterogenous, and these individuals may 
not rely upon their stereotypes of their 
ingroups when interacting with members of 
their ingroup (e.g., Hegarty & Pratto, 2004; 
Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). All people are 
not equally inclined to use stereotypes. Some 
individuals may rely upon stereotypes more 
than other individuals. 
Whether or not individuals engage in 
outgroup homogeneity may depend on other 
individual differences (e.g., personality 
differences). Individual differences may be a 
factor in how individuals pay attention to 
others, categorize others, remember 
information about others, and infer attributes 
about others. One such individual difference 
is the extent to which individuals will process 
and seek out information. 
Need for Cognition 
One individual difference that can affect 
individuals' processing of information is need for 
cognition. Need for cognition is defined to as "an 
individual's tendency to engage in and enjoy 
effortful cognitive endeavors" (Cacioppo, Petty, 
& Kao, 1984, p. 306). Individuals high in need 
for cognition seek out a variety of information 
about a target and enjoy effortful thought and 
problem solving (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; 
Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). 
Individuals low in need for cognition seek out 
the least amount of information about a target 
and do not enjoy effortful thought and problem 
solving (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et 
al., 1996). Individual differences in need for 
cognition can be a factor in the way individuals 
pay attention to information, interpret 
information, remember information, and infer 
from information (Cacioppo et al., 1996; 
Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983) . 
Because individuals high in need for 
cognition seek out a variety of information about 
a target, individuals high in need for cognition 
are more likely than individuals low in need for 
cognition to pay attention to a variety of 
information (e.g., Verplanken, Hazenberg, & 
Palenewen, 1992; Weiner, 1990). If an 
individual pays attention to a variety of 
information, this individual may notice 
information that is stereotype-disconfirming 
(e.g., Verplanken et al., 1992; Weiner, 1990). 
With more information that may include 
stereotype-disconfirming information, 
individuals high in need for cognition may not 
rely upon stereotypes when perceiving others 
(e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1996). If a perceiver high 
in need for cognition, for example, meets a man 
wearing flamboyant clothing, this perceiver may 
notice other information about this man such as 
paint brushes in this man's pocket, expensive 
shoes, and a wedding band. Because individuals 
low in need for cognition do not tend to seek out 
a variety of information about a target, 
individuals low in need for cognition are more 
likely than individuals high in need for cognition 
to pay attention to the least amount of 
information needed about a target (e.g., 
Verplanken et al., 1992; Weiner, 1990). If an 
individual pays attention to a small amount of 
information, this individual may not notice 
   
 
information that is stereotype disconfirming 
(e.g., Verplanken et al., 1992; Weiner, 1990). 
With less information that may not include 
stereotype-disconfirming information, 
individuals low in need for cognition may rely 
upon stereotypes when perceiving others (e.g., 
Cacioppo et al., 1996). If a perceiver low in need 
for cognition, for example, meets a man wearing 
flamboyant clothing, this perceiver may not 
notice other information about this man. 
Because individuals high in need for 
cognition notice a variety of information about a 
target, individuals high in need for cognition are 
more likely than individuals low in need for 
cognition to have a variety of interpretations for 
information about a target (e.g., Dudley & 
Harris, 2003; Weiner, 1990). With many 
possible interpretations for information about a 
target/others, individuals high in need for 
cognition may not rely upon a single 
interpretation of information based on a 
stereotype (e.g., Sargent, 2004). A perceiver 
high in need for cognition, for example, may 
notice that a woman has short hair as well as 
neatly applied makeup, painted nails, and is 
wearing pants. Because this perceiver has a 
variety of information, this perceiver may form 
many interpretations of this information (such as 
the woman being a businesswoman, a lesbian, or 
a busy housewife) which may not be based on a 
stereotype (Sargent, 2004). Because individuals 
low in need for cognition notice the least 
amount of information needed about a target, 
individuals low in need for cognition are more 
likely than individuals high in need for cognition 
to have a small number of interpretations for 
information about a target (e.g., Dudley & Harris, 
2003; Weiner, 1990). With few possible 
interpretations for information about a target, 
individuals low in need for cognition may rely 
upon a single interpretation of information based 
on a stereotype (e.g., Sargent, 2004). A 
perceiver low in need for cognition, for 
example, may notice only that a woman has 
short hair. Because this perceiver has a small 
amount of information, this perceiver may form 
only a few interpretation of this information that 
may be based on a stereotype (such as the woman 
being a lesbian because this perceiver has a 
stereotype of lesbians having short hair). 
Because individuals high in need for 
cognition pay attention to a variety of information, 
they are more likely than individuals low in need 
for cognition to remember a variety of information 
(e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986; 
Cacioppo et al., 1983; Kardash & Noel, 2000). 
Individuals high in need for cognition tend to seek 
out additional information about a target (Cacioppo 
et al., 1996). Individuals high in need for cognition 
may remember both stereotype confirming 
information and stereotype disconfirming 
information when recalling a target (e.g., Cacioppo 
et al., 1986; Cacioppo et al., 1983). A perceiver 
high in need for cognition, for example, may notice 
that a man wears flamboyant clothing, a wedding 
band, expensive shoes, and carries paintbrushes. 
This perceiver will remember a great deal of 
information about this man when recalling this man 
later. Because individuals low in need for cognition 
do not pay attention to a variety of information, 
they are more likely than individuals high in need 
for cognition to remember a small amount of 
information (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1986; Cacioppo 
et al., 1983). Individuals low in need for cognition 
tend to use stereotypes about a target (e.g., 
Cacioppo et al., 1986; Cacioppo et al., 1983). 
Individuals low in need for cognition may 
remember only stereotype confirming information 
when recalling a target (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 1986; 
Cacioppo et al., 1983). A perceiver low in need for 
cognition, for example, may notice only that a man 
wears flamboyant clothing. This perceiver will 
remember a small amount of information about this 
man when recalling this man later. 
Because individuals high in need for 
cognition pay attention to a variety of information 
and remember a variety of information about a 
target, they are more likely than individuals low in 
need for cognition not to infer stereotypical 
attributes to a target (e.g., Dudley & Harris, 2003). 
Individuals high in need for cognition seek out 
many different kinds of information about a target 
and do not need to infer other attributes of that target 
when they have collected a wealth of information 
about that target (e.g., Sargent, 2004). When 
individuals high in need for cognition do not have 
enough information about a target, these individuals 
high in need for cognition will seek it out (e.g., 
Levin, Huneke, & Jasper, 2000). Perceivers high in 
need for cognition, for example, may notice and 
   
 
remember that a woman has short hair, wears 
makeup, has painted nails, and wears trousers. 
Because this perceiver has many pieces of 
information about that woman, this perceiver may 
not infer other attributes of the woman (e.g., she is 
into sports). Because individuals low in need for 
cognition do not pay attention to a variety of 
information and remember a variety of information 
about a target, they are more likely than individuals 
high in need for cognition to infer stereotypical 
attributes to a target (e.g., Dudley & Harris, 2003). 
Individuals low in need for cognition do not seek 
out many different kinds of information about a 
target and do need to infer other attributes of that 
target because these individuals low in need for 
cognition do not have enough information about that 
target (e.g., Sargent, 2004). When individuals low in 
need for cognition do not have enough information 
about a target, these individuals low in need for 
cognition will rely upon their stereotypes to 
complete missing information (e.g., Levin et al., 
2000). Perceivers low in need for cognition may 
notice and remember only that a woman has short 
hair and wears trousers. Because this perceiver has 
few pieces of information about that woman, this 
perceiver may use a stereotype to infer other 
attributes about that woman (e.g., she is a lesbian). 
 
Hypotheses 
Based on this review of the literature 
pertaining to stereotypes, need for cognition, and 
the attitudes of gay men and lesbians, there are a 
few remaining questions. The attitudes of gay men 
and lesbians towards heterosexuals were not as 
thoroughly explored as were the attitudes of 
heterosexuals towards gay men and lesbians. A 
relationship between need for cognition and use of 
stereotypes had also not been explored. After 
reviewing the literature, three hypotheses were 
formed. First, participants will stereotype other 
individuals. That is, participants will attribute 
masculine and feminine qualities to a target 
individual depending on that target individual’s sex 
(male versus female) and sexual orientation 
(heterosexual versus homosexual). And second, the 
tendency for participants to stereotype target 
individuals will depend on these participants’ need 
for cognition. That is, participants low in need for 
cognition will be more likely than participants high 
in need for cognition to stereotype target individuals 
based on those target individuals’ sex and sexual 
orientation. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 276 participants were 
recruited for this study. One hundred sixty-
seven students were recruited from 
undergraduate psychology classes for this 
study. Participants recruited from 
undergraduate psychology classes received 
extra credit in their classes for their 
participation. Participants were able to choose 
from many other studies to receive extra 
credit. One hundred nine participants were 
recruited from an annual Gay Pride event 
during August 2004. The participants 
recruited from this Gay Pride event received a 
non-alcoholic beverage as compensation for 
their participation. All of the participants 
volunteered to take part in a study titled 
“Individual Differences in Perceptions of 
Social Groups.” 
 There were 159 females and 117 
males in this sample. Most participants (68%) 
were between the ages of 18 and 25 and were 
either currently enrolled in a university or had 
obtained an undergraduate degree. This 
sample is therefore atypical (Sears, 1986). 
Sears (1986) had found that participants who 
have been involved in college tend to be more 
open-minded and have been exposed to a 
wider variety of people. Therefore, results 
from this study may not generalize to the 
general US population. Participants’ mean 
age was 25.95 years (SD= 9.18 years). 
Participants’ modal age was 20 years.  
There were 213 Caucasian/White 
participants, 23 African American/Black 
participants, 21 Hispanic/Latino participants, 
10 Asian/Pacific Islander participants, and 9 
participants who chose other when asked 
about their race. There were 169 participants 
that identified themselves as heterosexual and 
107 participants that identified themselves as 
non-heterosexual (homosexual, bisexual, or 
transgendered). The researcher of this study 
discarded data from surveys in which a 
participant did not specify a sexual orientation 
or in which a participant wrote in a sexual 
   
 
orientation that could not be classified as 
heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, or 
transgendered. 
 Participants were given informed 
consent forms and were required to read and 
agree to information in this informed consent 
before continuing in this study. All 
participants were treated in accordance with 
the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and 
Code of Conduct (American Psychological 
Association, 2002). 
 
Procedure 
The method of gathering data at the 
Gay Pride event was slightly different from 
the method of gathering data at the University 
of North Florida. Participants recruited from 
the Gay Pride event were approached by a 
female researcher and asked to volunteer for a 
study. These participants were given a brief 
overview of this study and what was expected 
of them as participants. Participants were 
seated with up to three other participants at a 
table and all participants were given an 
informed consent form. She explained this 
informed consent to these participants. 
Participants were given an option to keep this 
informed consent form after they read it. 
Participants from the Gay Pride event did not 
sign these informed consent forms in order to 
preserve anonymity. Anonymity was crucial 
in order to establish good rapport with these 
participants due to the sensitive nature of their 
sexual orientation. This researcher reminded 
participants that their participation was 
voluntary and that they had the right to leave 
at any time should they become 
uncomfortable. Participants verbally agreed to 
continue their participation in this study after 
reading an informed consent. 
Participants recruited from the 
University of North Florida volunteered for 
this study by signing up on a bulletin board in 
the university’s psychology department. 
Participants were called or e-mailed by this 
researcher an evening before their 
appointment to remind them of the time and 
location for which they had signed up. 
Participants were taken into a room and 
seated with up to five other participants at a 
table. A female researcher handed each 
participant an informed consent form to read. 
She informed participants of the general 
purpose of this study, the importance of this 
study, participants’ right to withdraw at any 
time, the anticipated risks of this study, and 
the box where participants were to put their 
questionnaires upon completion. Participants 
verbally agreed to continue their participation 
in this study after reading an informed 
consent. There were no other procedural 
differences between the manner in which 
participants were recruited from the Gay 
Pride event and the manner in which 
participants were recruited from the 
University of North Florida. 
This researcher gave participants a 
five-page questionnaire and asked participants 
to write their responses directly on this 
questionnaire. Participants were instructed not 
to put any identifying information on their 
questionnaires. Participants were randomly 
assigned one of four questionnaires: (1) a 
questionnaire in which participants were 
asked for their attitudes about a typical 
lesbian/homosexual woman on the first page 
and then asked for their attitudes about a 
typical gay/homosexual man on the second 
page, (2) a questionnaire in which participants 
were asked for their attitudes about a typical 
gay/homosexual man on the first page and 
then asked for their attitudes about a typical 
lesbian/homosexual woman on the second 
page, (3) a questionnaire in which participants 
were asked for their attitudes about a typical 
straight/heterosexual man on the first page 
and then asked for their attitudes about a 
typical straight/heterosexual woman on the 
second page, and (4) a questionnaire in which 
participants were asked for their attitudes 
about a typical straight/heterosexual woman 
on the first page and then asked for their 
attitudes about a typical straight/heterosexual 
man on the second page. Order of the sex and 
sexual orientation of these targets was 
counterbalanced to control for possible 
priming effects that sex and/or sexual 
orientation may have had on these 
participants’ attitudes.  
   
 
Participants were asked to indicate 
their attitudes toward each target using 40 
items taken directly from the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory (Bem, 1974). Examples of items 
were ‘Makes decisions easily,’ ‘Warm,’ and 
‘Acts as a leader.’ In the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory there was a 20-item Masculinity 
subscale and a 20-item Femininity subscale. 
Participants could have viewed each target 
person as masculine and/or as feminine. 
Examples of items on the Masculinity 
subscale were ‘Self-reliant,’ ‘Athletic,’ and 
‘Assertive.’ Examples of items on the 
Femininity subscale were ‘Yielding,’ 
‘Affectionate,’ and ‘Sensitive to the needs of 
others.’  
Participants judged these targets using 
a 5-point scale with response options labeled 
(a) not at all characteristic, (b) mostly not 
characteristic, (c) sometimes characteristic, 
(d) mostly characteristic, and (e) completely 
characteristic. Responses to items on the 
Masculinity and Femininity subscales of the 
Bem Sex Role Inventory were scored 
separately. Responses to individual items 
were scored by assigning a numerical score of 
1 to (a), 2 to (b), 3 to (c), 4 to (d), and 5 to (e). 
Participants’ responses were scored to yield a 
separate score on both the Masculinity 
subscale and the Femininity subscale of the 
Bem Sex Role Inventory. Scores on the 
Masculinity subscale and scores on the 
Femininity subscale of the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory were summed separately to indicate 
the participant’s attitude toward each target 
person. Participants who viewed a target 
person as masculine obtained scores on the 
Masculinity subscale of the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory that ranged from 70-100 and 
obtained scores on the Femininity subscale of 
the Bem Sex Role Inventory that ranged from 
20-69. Participants who viewed a target 
person as feminine obtained scores on the 
Masculinity subscale of the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory that ranged from 20-69 and 
obtained scores on the Femininity subscale of 
the Bem Sex Role Inventory that ranged from 
70-100.  
Several researchers (Bem, 1974; Bem, 
1981; Wilson & Cook, 1984) have found 
scores on the Bem Sex Role Inventory to be 
reliable on both the Masculinity (Cronbach's 
alphas of.86, .86, and .88, respectively) and 
Femininity (Cronbach's alphas of .80, .82, and 
.78, respectively) subscales. Bem reported 
test-retest reliability correlations in her 1974 
study for scores on the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory (Masculinity r=.90, Femininity 
r=.90). The test-retest reliability found on 
scores in Bem’s (1974) study has also been 
supported by Yanico (1985), in which female 
students from a university were tested twice 
over a 4-year interval. Yanico found a test-
retest correlation after the 4-year testing 
interval for scores on both the Masculinity 
(r=.56) and the Femininity (r=.68) subscales 
of the Bem Sex Role Inventory. 
In this study, when a target was a 
heterosexual man, a Cronbach’s alpha of .89 
was obtained from participants’ scores on the 
Masculinity subscale of the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory and a Cronbach’s alpha of .87 was 
obtained from participants’ scores on the 
Femininity subscale of the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory. When a target was a heterosexual 
woman, a Cronbach’s alpha of .86 was 
obtained from participants’ scores on the 
Masculinity subscale of the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory and a Cronbach’s alpha of .86 was 
obtained from participants’ scores on the 
Femininity subscale of the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory. When a target person was a 
homosexual man, a Cronbach’s alpha of .81 
was obtained from participants’ scores on the 
Masculinity subscale of the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory and a Cronbach’s alpha of .79 was 
obtained from participants’ scores on the 
Femininity subscale of the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory. When a target person was a 
homosexual woman, a Cronbach’s alpha of 
.83 was obtained from participants’ scores on 
the Masculinity subscale of the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory and a Cronbach’s alpha of .84 was 
obtained from participants’ scores on the 
Femininity subscale of the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory. 
Bem (1974) found scores on the 
Masculinity subscale and the Femininity 
subscale of the Bem Sex Role Inventory to be 
independent of one another. Bem found no 
   
 
correlation between scores on the Bem Sex 
Role Inventory and scores on the Guilford-
Zimmerman Temperament Survey tests used 
to diagnose being bipolar. Many researchers 
(e.g., Bohannon & Mills, 1979; Evans & 
Dinning, 1982; Volentine, 1981) have found a 
correlation between scores on the Fe scale of 
the CPI and scores on the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory. Although the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory was designed using a normative 
sample gathered from a college-aged 
population, the Bem Sex Role Inventory has 
been administered to people from many age 
ranges without serious measurement problems 
(Lenney, 1991).  
On all four versions of the 
questionnaire used in this study, there were 
questions about demographic information on 
the third page of this questionnaire. 
Participants indicated their age by writing 
their actual age on a blank line. Participants 
indicated their race/ethnicity by circling either 
(a) Caucasian/White, (b) African 
American/Black, (c) Hispanic/Latino, (d) 
Asian/Pacific Islander, or (e) Other.   
Participants indicated their highest completed 
level of education by circling either (a) No 
high school diploma or GED, (b) High school 
diploma or GED, (c) Some college, but no 
degree, (d) Bachelor’s degree, or (e) Some 
graduate education or graduate degree. 
Participants indicated their sexual orientation 
by circling either (a) Homosexual, (b) 
Bisexual, (c) Transgender, or (d) 
Heterosexual. Participants indicated how 
“open” they were about their sexual 
orientation by circling either (a) Completely 
open, (b) Open to most people, (c) Open to 
some people, (d) Open to a few people, or (e) 
Not at all open. Participants who had 
indicated that they were Gay, Lesbian, 
Bisexual, or Transgendered also indicated 
how long they had identified as such by 
circling either (a) Less than 1 year, (b) 1 to 5 
years, (c) 6-10 years, or (d) More than 10 
years.  
The fourth and fifth pages of this 
questionnaire were the 18-item Need for 
Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 
1984). Cacioppo and Petty (1982) designed 
the Need for Cognition Scale to assess 
individual differences in participants’ need for 
cognition. Participants read self-descriptive 
statements of situations and ideas (e.g., “I 
only think as hard as I have to”). Participants 
then agreed or disagreed with these 
statements. Participants responded to these 
statements using a 5-point Likert scale: (a) 
strongly disagree, (b) disagree, (c) neutral, 
(d) agree, and (e) strongly agree. Half of the 
items on the Need for Cognition Scale were 
positively worded for need for cognition (e.g., 
“I would prefer complex to simple 
problems.”). Agreement on these items 
indicated a high need for cognition 
(Cacioppo, et al., 1984). The other half of the 
items on the Need for Cognition Scale were 
negatively worded for need for cognition 
(e.g., “I like tasks that require little thought 
once I’ve learned them.”). Agreement on 
these items indicated a low need for cognition 
(Cacioppo, et al., 1984).  
 Responses to items on the Need for 
Cognition Scale that were negatively worded 
were reverse scored. Scores on individual 
items were summed. Scores on the Need for 
Cognition Scale could range from 18-90. 
Participants were categorized as either high in 
need for cognition or as low in need for 
cognition according to a median split of 
scores on the Need for Cognition Scale. 
 The researcher chose the 18-item 
Need for Cognition Scale as opposed to the 
34-item Need for Cognition Scale for this 
study. Scores on both versions of the Need for 
Cognition Scale were found to be highly 
correlated (r=.95) with each other (Cacioppo, 
et al., 1984; Cacioppo et al., 1996). Several 
researchers (e.g., Berzonsky & Sullivan, 
1992; Kernis, Granneman, & Barclay, 1992; 
Verplanken, 1993) have found scores on the 
Need for Cognition Scale to be internally 
consistent and reliable (Cronbach’s alphas of 
greater than or equal to .85). Sadowski and 
Gulgoz (1992) found a test-retest reliability of 
.88 over a 7-week testing interval using the 
18-item Need for Cognition Scale. A 
Cronbach’s alpha of .86 was derived from 
scores obtained from the current sample using 
the 18-item Need for Cognition Scale.  
   
 
  Researchers have found a high need 
for cognition as defined by scores on 
measures of Need for Cognition to be 
positively related to behavior such as 
enjoying thought, actively pursuing 
information, seeking out and focusing on 
relevant information when making decisions 
(Berzonsky & Sullivan, 1992), being open-
minded (Berzonsky & Sullivan, 1992), and 
using empirical facts on which to base their 
judgments (Leary, Sheppard, McNeil, 
Jenkins, & Barnes, 1986). In contrast, 
researchers have found a high need for 
cognition  as defined by scores on measures 
of Need for Cognition to be negatively related 
to behavior such as a tendency to (a) overlook 
or ignore information that is new 
(Venkatraman, Marlino, Kardes, & Skylar, 
1990), (b) prefer predictable situations and 
people (Petty & Jarvis, 1996; Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994), (c) be close-minded (Petty 
& Jarvis, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), 
and (d) be decisive (Petty & Jarvis, 1996; 
Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).  
While participants completed their 
questionnaires, a researcher remained nearby 
to answer any questions and to watch for 
signs of distress. This researcher was able to 
refer participants recruited from the 
University of North Florida to a counseling 
service on campus if necessary. Participants 
placed their completed questionnaires in an 
unmarked box at the end of a table and 
collected their beverage if recruited from 
Pride or their extra credit slip if recruited 
from the University of North Florida before 
leaving this testing area.  
 
Results 
 The design of this study was a 2 
(participant need for cognition: high or low) 
by 2 (target sex: male or female) by 2 (target 
sexual orientation: heterosexual or non-
heterosexual) by 2 (gender of attributions: 
masculine or feminine) factorial design. The 
between-subjects predictor variables of this 
study were participant need for cognition and 
target sexual orientation. The within-subjects 
predictor variables of this study were gender 
attributions and target sex. The criterion 
variable of this study was participant ratings 
of targets on a measure of masculinity and 
femininity. Results were analyzed using an 
analysis of variance procedure. 
 
Preliminary Analyses  
Because participant sex and 
participant need for cognition were measured 
and not manipulated, it was necessary to run 
preliminary data analyses to determine if 
there was multicolinearity between these 
variables. A chi-square analysis was run with 
participant sex (male versus female) and 
participant need for cognition (high versus 
low) as independent variables. Participant sex 
was not significantly related to participant 
need for cognition, χ2 (1, N = 276) = 1.12, p = 
0.29. In this sample, participant sex was not 
confounded with participant need for 
cognition.  
 
Main Analyses 
It was predicted that participants 
would engage in stereotyping targets by 
making certain personality attributions of 
these targets. Specifically, it was expected 
that participants would engage in stereotyping 
by attributing more masculine than feminine 
qualities to heterosexual male targets, by 
attributing more feminine than masculine 
qualities to heterosexual female targets, by 
attributing more feminine qualities to 
homosexual male targets than to heterosexual 
male targets, and by attributing more 
masculine qualities to homosexual female 
targets than to heterosexual female targets. 
Support for this hypothesis is found in the 
introduction of this paper. This tendency to 
stereotype was expected to be more evident 
for participants low in need for cognition than 
for participants high in need for cognition. 
Support for this hypothesis would be evident 
by a four-way interaction between the 
following variables: participant need for 
cognition (high vs. low), target sexual 
orientation (heterosexual vs. homosexual), 
target sex (male vs. female), and gender of 
attributions (masculine vs. feminine).  
  
   
 
Main Effects. There was a main effect of 
target sex on participant ratings of targets 
across measures of both masculinity and 
femininity, F(1, 272) = 19.07, p < .01. 
Participants made more extreme ratings of 
female targets (M = 69.17, SD = 5.68) than of 
male targets (M = 64.86, SD = 5.30) 
regardless of participant need for cognition, 
target sexual orientation, and attribution 
gender.  
 There was also a main effect of 
attribution gender on participant ratings 
across all targets, F(1, 272) = 63.29, p < .01. 
Participants made more extreme ratings on 
masculine items (M = 67.38, SD = 6.47) than 
on feminine items (M = 63.65, SD = 6.03) 
regardless of participant need for cognition, 
target sex, or target sexual orientation. 
 
Interactions. There was a two-way 
interaction between target sex and attribution 
gender on participant ratings of targets across 
measures of both masculinity and femininity, 
F(1, 272) = 72.82, p < .01. This two-way 
interaction was qualified by a three-way 
interaction which involved target sex, 
attribution gender, and target sexual 
orientation, F(1, 272) = 419.46, p < .001. This 
three-way interaction was qualified by a four-
way interaction which involved target sex, 
target sexual orientation, attribution gender in 
addition, and participant need for cognition, 
F(1, 272) = 4.02, p < .05.  
This four-way interaction was broken 
down into two “simple” three-way 
interactions (target sex, participant need for 
cognition, and gender of attributions) 
blocking on target sexual orientation. This 
simple three-way interaction was not reliable 
when the target sexual orientation was 
homosexual, F < 1.00. In other words, this 
simple three-way interaction was, however, 
reliable when the target sexual orientation 
was heterosexual, F(1,138) = 4.81, p < .01.  
This reliable simple three-way 
interaction with heterosexual targets was then 
broken down into two “simple” two-way 
interactions (target sex and gender of 
attribution) blocking on participant need for 
cognition. This simple two-way interaction 
was reliable with participants low in need for 
cognition, F(1,69) = 132.62, p < .01. This 
simple two-way interaction was also reliable 
with participants high in need for cognition, 
F(1,69) = 212.12, p < .01.  
Both reliable simple two-way 
interactions were then broken down into 
“simple” main effects using gender of the 
attribution. There was a simple main effect 
for attribution gender for participants low in 
need for cognition rating heterosexual male 
targets, F(1,69) = 107.08, p < .01. Individuals 
low in need for cognition rated heterosexual 
male targets as more masculine (M = 73.60, 
SD = 8.25) than feminine (M = 55.83, SD = 
8.80). There also was a simple main effect for 
gender for participants low in need for 
cognition rating heterosexual female targets, 
F(1,69) = 93.54, p < .01. Individuals low in 
need for cognition rated heterosexual female 
targets as more feminine (M = 71.63, SD = 
6.45) than masculine (M = 60.29, SD = 7.19).  
Similarly, there was a simple main 
effect for gender for participants high in need 
for cognition rating heterosexual male targets, 
F(1,69) = 167.44, p < .01. Individuals high in 
need for cognition also rated heterosexual 
male targets as more masculine (M = 76.43, 
SD = 9.41) than feminine (M = 53.70, SD = 
8.78). Additionally, there was a simple main 
effect for gender for participants high in need 
for cognition rating heterosexual female 
targets, F(1,69) = 85.03, p < .01. Individuals 
high in need for cognition also rated 
heterosexual female targets as more feminine 
(M = 74.44, SD = 8.68) than masculine (M = 
60.2, SD = 8.67). 
In short, participants high in need for 
cognition made more extreme masculine 
ratings of heterosexual male targets than did 
participants low in need for cognition. 
Participants high in need for cognition also 
made more extreme feminine ratings of 
heterosexual female targets than did 
participants low in need for cognition. In this 
sample, individuals high in need for cognition 
were apparently more likely than individuals 
low in need for cognition to rely upon sex role 
stereotypes when thinking about heterosexual 
persons.  
   
 
Discussion 
 
 There were two hypotheses in this 
study about stereotyping and need for 
cognition. It was hypothesized that 
participants would stereotype other 
individuals (targets) such that participants 
would attribute masculine and feminine 
qualities to a target depending on that target’s 
sex (male versus female) and sexual 
orientation (heterosexual versus homosexual). 
Specifically, participants would stereotype 
heterosexual men as more masculine than 
feminine and heterosexual women as more 
feminine than masculine. Similarly, 
participants would stereotype homosexual 
men as more feminine than masculine and 
homosexual women as more masculine than 
feminine. It was also hypothesized that 
participants would stereotype more or less 
depending on these participants’ need for 
cognition. Specifically, it was expected that 
participants low in need for cognition would 
be more likely than participants high in need 
for cognition to stereotype target individuals 
based on those target individuals’ sex and 
sexual orientation.  
 The first hypothesis of this study was 
largely supported. Participants stereotyped 
targets based on target sex and target sexual 
orientation. As expected, participants thought 
heterosexual male targets had more masculine 
traits than feminine traits. Similarly, 
participants thought heterosexual female 
targets had more feminine traits than 
masculine traits. These results are consistent 
with other results in which researchers found 
that men were thought of as more masculine 
than feminine and women were thought of as 
more feminine than masculine (e.g., Eagly & 
Mladinic, 1989; Lenney, 1991; Prentice & 
Carranza, 2002).  
As expected, participants thought of 
homosexual female targets as possessing 
more masculine traits than feminine traits. 
Other researchers have also found that 
participants thought of homosexual women as 
violating traditional feminine sex-roles (e.g., 
Jellison, McConnell, & Gabriel, 2004; Taylor, 
1983) and thought of homosexual women as 
being similar to heterosexual men (e.g., Kite 
& Deaux, 1987).  
Contrary to expectations, participants 
did not think homosexual male targets had 
more feminine traits than masculine traits. 
Instead, participants thought homosexual 
male targets were androgynous. Androgynous 
individuals have both masculine traits and 
feminine traits (Bem, 1974). These results are 
consistent with other results in which 
researchers found that homosexual men were 
thought of as more androgynous than as 
masculine or feminine. For example, 
McDonald and Moore (1978) found that 
homosexual men viewed themselves as more 
androgynous than as feminine or as 
masculine. Similarly, Robinson, Skeen, and 
Flake-Hobson (1982) conducted research 
using both homosexual and heterosexual male 
participants. These researchers found that 
homosexual men are more comfortable 
thinking of themselves as androgynous than 
are heterosexual men. Contrary to these 
findings, other researchers found that 
participants thought of homosexual men as 
violating traditional masculine sex-roles (e.g., 
Jellison, McConnell, & Gabriel, 2004; 
Madon, 1997) and thought of homosexual 
men as being similar to heterosexual women 
(e.g., Kite & Deaux, 1987; Madon, 1997).  
 The second hypothesis of this study 
was not supported. Participants low in need 
for cognition did not stereotype more than 
participants high in need for cognition. 
Contrary to this hypothesis, participants high 
in need for cognition stereotyped more than 
did participants low in need for cognition. 
This finding was significant when participants 
were asked to think about heterosexual male 
but not heterosexual female, homosexual 
male, or homosexual female targets. This 
finding is partially supported by other 
researchers such as Crawford and Skowronski 
(1998) who found that participants high in 
need for cognition and participants low in 
need for cognition both use stereotypes. 
Haugvedt and Petty (1992) also found that 
when presented with an unfamiliar target, 
participants high in need for cognition and 
participants low in need for cognition both 
   
 
had similar attitudes about an unfamiliar 
target. It is possible that a portion of 
participants in this sample did not have much 
personal exposure with groups such as 
homosexual men and homosexual women. 
This lack of exposure to groups such as 
homosexual men and homosexual women 
would make these groups unfamiliar to 
participants high in need for cognition and 
low in need for cognition. If these targets 
were unfamiliar to participants high in need 
for cognition and low in need for cognition, 
then these participants could have similar 
thoughts about these unfamiliar groups.  
Participants also could have been 
influenced by situational factors such as 
cognitive load (Dudley & Harris, 2002). A 
heavy cognitive load occurs when individuals 
experience a large amount of information 
(Dudley & Harris, 2002). Because individuals 
must expend some cognitive resources 
separating important information from 
unimportant information, these individuals 
may not be able to focus on relevant 
information (Dudley & Harris, 2002). These 
individuals may then spend little time 
thinking about a target based on that target’s 
individual characteristics and rely heavily on 
heuristics such as stereotypes to lessen 
cognitive load (Dudley & Harris, 2002). If 
participants high in need for cognition were 
experiencing a heavy cognitive load during 
this study, then these participants may have 
also used stereotypes.  
 
Plausible Alternative Explanations 
 There are a few plausible alternative 
explanations for the results of this study. It is 
possible that participants engaged in socially 
desirable responding. Participants could have 
been attempting to appear socially appropriate 
by responding to questions according to 
widely held stereotypes about men and 
women as well as homosexuals and 
heterosexuals. To mitigate this possible 
alternative explanation, participants were 
informed that their answers would be 
anonymous. However, it is still possible that 
participants felt some pressure to respond in a 
socially desirable manner. Given the 
methodology of this study (i.e., anonymity of 
answers and participation), this possible 
alternative explanation is not plausible. 
Additionally, participants did not respond as 
expected. Participants thought of gay men as 
being androgynous. A widely held stereotype 
about gay men is that gay men are more 
feminine than masculine (e.g., Jackson & 
Sullivan, 1989; Kite & Whitley, 1996; 
Madon, 1997). Thus, participants did not 
engage in socially desirable responding 
because they did not respond with this widely 
held stereotype about gay men. 
 It is possible that participants high in 
need for cognition and participants low in 
need for cognition both stereotype for 
different reasons. Participants high in need for 
cognition are less likely than participants low 
in need for cognition to use simple heuristics 
(Cacioppo et al., 1996). Participants high in 
need for cognition, however, are more likely 
than participants low in need for cognition to 
have exposure to media such as newspapers 
and television (Cacioppo et al., 1996). People 
in the media often rely upon sex role and 
sexual orientation stereotypes (e.g., Hurtz & 
Durkin, 2004; Kolbe & Langefeld, 1993; 
Renn & Calvert, 1993). The more individuals 
are exposed to information, the easier these 
individuals can access this information 
(Schneider, 2004). Because participants high 
in need for cognition could have had more 
exposure than participants low in need for 
cognition to these sex role and sexual 
orientation stereotypes in the media, 
participants high in need for cognition could 
have been primed by this repeated media 
exposure to respond to questions in this study 
using stereotypes (Cacioppo et al., 1983). 
 
Limitations 
There were a few limitations of this 
study. One limitation was the methodology 
used in this study. Participants were asked to 
answer self-report measures about broad 
categories of people. These results may not 
have been the same had the researchers of this 
study looked at participants’ behavior. 
Another way to measure participants’ 
stereotypes would be to use tests such as the 
   
 
Implicit Association Test (IAT) which is used 
to measure participant response time 
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). 
Participants respond faster to words that are 
consistent with these participants’ stereotypes 
than to words that are inconsistent with these 
participants’ stereotypes (e.g., Brendl, 
Markman, & Messner, 2001; Greenwald et al, 
1998; Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & 
Schwartz, 1999). If participants were asked to 
think about lesbians and these participants 
had a stereotype that lesbians were masculine, 
for example, then these participants would 
respond faster if presented with a word that 
was consistent with his/her stereotype such as 
“aggressive” than if presented with a word 
that was inconsistent with his/her stereotype 
such as “gentle.” Another way to measure 
participants’ stereotypes would be to use tests 
such as the “startle eye blink.” Mahaffey, 
Bryan, and Hutchinson (2005) used the 
“startle eye blink” measure to look at 
participants’ affective responses to 
homosexual men, homosexual women, and 
homosexual couples. These researchers found 
that when participants with a strong anti-gay 
bias were exposed to photographs of 
homosexuals, these participants had a strong 
physiological reaction (i.e., blinking).  
Another limitation of this study was 
recruitment of participants. Approximately 
half of the participants in this study were 
recruited from a mid-sized north Florida 
university whereas approximately half of the 
participants in this study were recruited from 
a Gay Pride event in north Florida. 
Participants recruited from the university 
setting may have had different expectations 
about this study than did participants recruited 
from the Gay Pride event. Participants 
recruited from the university were tested 
within a lab at the university and these 
participants could have been primed by their 
setting to take this study more seriously than 
did participants recruited at the Gay Pride 
event. Participants recruited at the Gay Pride 
event were tested outdoors within the context 
of a celebration and these participants could 
have been primed by their setting to take this 
study less seriously than did participants 
recruited at the university.  
 
Future Directions 
Future directions for this area of 
research include broadening the nature of 
targets. For example, there are only a few 
researchers who have looked at people’s 
perceptions of bisexual men and women (e.g., 
Herek, 2002). Additionally, there are only a 
few researchers who have looked at what 
homosexuals think of groups such as 
heterosexuals and bisexuals (e.g., Lyons, 
Brenner, & Fassinger, 2005; White & 
Franzini, 1999). Lack of research on the 
views of homosexuals, bisexuals, and 
transgendered individuals may have a 
negative impact on matters such as social 
policy and law making. Many people who 
make laws, policies, and medical research 
consider only a population made up of 
heterosexual men and women and rarely 
consider homosexual, bisexual, or 
transgendered individuals. This lack of 
consideration leads to biased laws, policies, 
and medical research. 
Other future directions include 
looking at behavior rather than answers on a 
self-report measure. The researchers of this 
study looked at participants’ responses on a 
questionnaire and not at what participants 
would actually do when interacting with a gay 
or lesbian individual. It would be interesting 
to look at what participants thought about 
homosexual men and women when answering 
a questionnaire and then to look at how these 
same participants interacted with an 
individual who was gay or lesbian. 
Researchers that looked at both participants’ 
responses to questionnaires and then looked at 
these same participants’ interactions with 
individuals who were gay or lesbian might 
find a correlation between reported attitudes 
and behavior may be established. 
Alternatively, it would be interesting to see if 
participants who interacted with a gay or 
lesbian individual would later have stronger 
or weaker stereotypes about homosexual men 
and women based on these participants’ 
interactions with gay and lesbian individuals.  
   
 
Other future directions include 
looking at how stereotyped groups such as 
gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals are treated 
by health care providers and medical 
researchers. For example, other researchers 
have found that lesbians and bisexual women 
engage in many risky sexual behaviors and 
are exposed to sexually transmitted diseases 
(e.g., Champion, Wilford, Shain, & Piper, 
2005; Morrow & Allsworth, 2000). Due to 
this lack of research and information about 
lesbians, most medical information about 
females is written specifically about 
heterosexual women (e.g., Arend, 2005; 
Youngman & Meryn, 2004). Other 
researchers have found that gay men, 
lesbians, and bisexuals have had 
unsatisfactory experiences with health care 
providers due to these health care providers’ 
lack of knowledge about gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual health needs (e.g., Allen, Glciken, 
beach, & Naylor, 1998; Beehler, 2001; 
Bonvicini & Perlin, 2003). Additionally, 
health care providers may have stereotypes 
about gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals that 
could bias how health care providers treat gay 
men, lesbians, and bisexuals (e.g., Beehler, 
2001; Dean, Meyer, Robinson, Sell, Sember, 
Silenzio et al., 2000).  
 
Conclusions 
 Individuals use stereotypes when 
perceiving men and women as well as 
homosexuals and heterosexuals. The way 
individuals use stereotypes may affect the 
way these individuals judge groups of people 
such as men and women as well as 
homosexuals and heterosexuals. Stereotypes, 
even though used by everyone, can be 
harmful when used to create laws and social 
sanctions on certain groups. Negative 
stereotypes about groups such as homosexuals 
can lead to discrimination based on 
membership in these stereotyped groups. 
People who discriminate against homosexuals 
may commit acts of discrimination which 
include violence. For example, recall the well 
publicized murder of Matthew Sheppard in 
Laramie, Wyoming  
(http://abcnews.go.com/2020/print?id=27768
5). Matthew was beaten and left to die in the 
cold by a group of young men who knew that 
Matthew was gay.  People who discriminate 
against homosexuals have also supported laws 
which separate homosexuals from the 
majority in an unequal way by refusing 
certain privileges or rights. For example, the 
Defense of Marriage Act (1996) was written 
to prevent homosexuals from marrying. Law 
makers defined marriage as one man and one 
woman. So, gay men and lesbians cannot get 
married. Married couples gain many federal 
rights and protections such as tax breaks and 
hospital visitation. If more individuals were 
made aware of the prevalence of stereotypes 
and the inaccuracies of these stereotypes, 
there is a chance that these negative 
stereotypes can be dispelled and groups such 
as gay men and lesbians can gain equal rights 
and experience less violence and 
discrimination than gay men and lesbians 
have experienced in the past. 
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